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Individualism 
Individualism in classical economics concerns the roles individuals play in 
an economic process understood primarily in terms of classes, and thus 
lacks the connotations that typically attach to the term in present-day eco-
nomics. Indeed, individualism is generally associated with neoclassical 
economics rather than classical economics, and consequently it will be 
helpful to distinguish individualism in neoclassicism in setting out a classi-
cal understanding of the concept. The term ' individualism' has different 
meanings according to whether one is concerned with the analysis of 
action and causality, value theory or the social conception of the individ-
ual. The discussion here contrasts neoclassical and classical economics in 
each of these three respects. It concludes with an appraisal of the compar-
ative grounds for their respective conceptions of individualism. 
Action and causality 
Neoclassical economics is methodologically individualist in that it 
assumes that the decisions of individuals are the source of all action, and 
that actions undertaken by groups of individuals are in principle always 
explainable in terms of the actions of individuals. Individual decisions 
are themselves explained in terms of individual psychology, more specifi-
cally in terms of privately held beliefs and inner desires, where the latter -
the motive force behind actions undertaken - are assumed to vary to such 
an extent across individuals as to require that action be explained individ-
ually. That individual interest is understood solely in terms of private 
desires implies that self-interest excludes the interests of others, or at best 
makes promotion of others' interests a means to the pursuit of self-inter-
est. (Acts of 'altruism' always enhance own utility.) A further, 
independent assumption is that the effects of individuals acting on pri-
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vate desires are sufficiently distinct in their impact on economic life to 
account for distinguishable patterns of events. Consequently, as a causal 
theory of explanation, neoclassicism supposes that the domain econom-
ics concerns is only adequately addressed when cause-and effect patterns 
are distinguished on an individual-by-individual basis. This domain of 
concern in economics is taken to be supply-and-demand price formation 
in markets for individual goods and services. As a theory of action, then, 
neoclassicism makes a double claim that methodological individualism 
succeeds in its chosen domain of explanation, and that there are no other 
possible domains of interest in economic life, or at least ones susceptible 
to systematic examination. 
Classical economics, especially as originally developed in Adam 
Smith's analysis of moral sentiments (Smith, 1976 [1759]), understands 
individuals to be socially situated in the sense that ~heir individual psy-
chologies reflect shared desires and feelings. Individuals may still act out 
of self-interest, but because individuals in like situations often possess 
like desires, their actions tend not to distinguish them individually, nor 
are the effects of their actions particularly distinct in their impact on eco-
nomic events. Individuals' self-interest, then, may include regard for 
others, who share similar desires and interests - indeed, Smith supposes 
individuals capable of empathy for one another. Reasoning in this 
manner discourages thinking of psychology as sharply separate from 
sociology, ethics, theology, jurisprudence and history, since shared desires 
and interests typically intermediate across the spheres these different sub-
jects concern. This more holistic approach to understanding the motive 
force behind action also encourages thinking of agency in collective 
terms, since, as the classical economists recognized, broad distinctions in 
social-economic orientation and motivation to act can be identified in 
terms of group and class affiliations. Consequently, methodological col-
lectivism as an alternative to methodological individualism rather 
assumes that classes and groups of individuals are the principal source of 
action in economic life, and that individual behaviour where these affilia-
tions are involved can itself be explained to a large degree in terms of an 
individual's class or group interests. 
Value theory 
That individual desires arguably do not vary across individuals to the 
extent methodological individualism requires raises questions about 
whether neoclassicism succeeds in its chosen domain of explanation. 
Putting aside this issue for the moment, how does classicism's alternative 
view of the individual mark out a domain of explanation susceptible to sys-
tematic examination overlooked or ignored by neoclassical economics? The 
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latter's focus is supply-and-demand price formation in markets for indi-
vidual goods and services. David Ricardo (I951 [1817]) , in contrast, 
developed both a labour value analysis for reproducible commodities and 
an account of the distributional shares of the three 'main classes of early 
19th-century England. Labour values are explained in terms of labour 
time of average skill and energy necessary for a commodity's manufac-
ture. They presuppose working individuals share a capacity to labour that 
any typical working person may exercise. Distributional shares accrue to 
individuals as members of classes. They presuppose interrelated sets of 
social relations which explain individuals' relative positions in the produc-
tion process. It is important not to draw the mistaken conclusion from 
this that faceless classes are at root in the c1assicals' explanation of value. 
Rather, because individuals in similar circumstances act in similar ways, 
their actions as individuals are in important degree explainable in terms 
of their shared commitments. That is, the classical approach to value 
operates in terms of individuals, but emphasizes that individuals are 
socially embedded. 
This latter point may be re-stated by distinguishing the neoclassical 
and classical approaches to value as subjective and objective, respectively. 
Neoclassical economics employs a conception of individuals shorn of all 
social connection by characterizing desire and interest - more formally, 
preferences - in a radically subjective way. By assumption, individual psy-
chology may not be explained in terms of anything social scientists may 
reasonably claim about the nature of human beings (indeed even psychol-
ogists are not consulted), so that all that is left to be done is formally to 
order a possible individual's imagined .set of desires according to some 
hypothesized index (utility or simply a given preference ordering). In con-
trast, classical economics employs a conception of individuals that 
explains motivation more conservatively by attributing plausible social 
characteristics to historical individuals that provide grounds for identify-
ing their likely desires. This approach to value is objective in that it makes 
value magnitudes a function of sets of social patterns upon which differ-
ent social sciences may empirically converge. The classical approach to 
individual action, behaviour and value, then, is objective, both because it 
eschews neoclassicism's narrow view of individual psychology and 
because it methodologically resists strategies of theorizing that may lead 
to arbitrariness and artificiality. 
Alternative social conceptions of the individual 
These differences naturally direct attention towards the topic of the com-
parative social conceptions of the individual in neoclassical and classical 
economics, where this concerns the way a vision of society defines individ-
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ual capacities and well-being. Though the emphasis thus far has been on 
how neoclassical and classical economics explicitly understand the nature 
of individuals, each also has a view of the economy as a whole which in 
turn corresponds to a view of the society in which the economy operates. 
From this vantage point, individuals may be inferred to be certain types of 
beings with fairly specific horizons. Thus neoclassical theory in its para-
digmatic competitive general equilibrium form almost always rests on the 
idea that human society depends upon a system of private property rela-
tively evenly distributed across individuals. Individuals' capacities to act 
are then strictly explained as a capacity to freely exchange property accu-
mulations in such a way as to produce marginal improvements in 
individual well-being. Well-being is essentially private in nature, because it 
derives from consuming privately owned property to satisfy private desires. 
It is susceptible of only marginal improvements, because changes in well-
being are tied to incremental changes in consumption.· 
Classical economics begins with the idea that the economy resembles 
an organism functionally organized to grow (more or less healthily) 
through time. The economy's sectors are linked through a production 
process that provides for necessary consumption, and creates a surplus 
for growth and/or discretionary consumption. Classes or groups of indi-
viduals are distinguished according to the functions in which they engage, 
implying that individual capacities to act and standards for well-being are 
explained in terms of class activities. However, in contrast to neoclassical 
economics, there is an .important element of indeterminacy in a classi-
cally understood economy, since there is no mechanism to resolve social 
disputes over the use of an economy's surplus. This means that, while 
individual capacities and well-being are well-defined with respect to par-
ticipation in production, they are not well-defined in regard to full 
consumption, where this involves both point-in-time use of goods to sus-
tain participation in production, and also consumption to determine the 
reproduction of types of roles - thus capacities and well-being - for indi-
viduals through time. 
These differences between neoclassical and classical economics regard-
ing the capacities and well-being of the individual can be further 
elucidated by comparing their different perspectives on social justice. 
Judgments about the justice or injustice of social arrangements as applied 
to particular individuals help us elicit the expectations different types of 
social--economic systems create regarding individual capacities and well-
being. Thus that it is unjust in a neoclassical economy to forcibly seize or 
damage others' property and just to fulfil one's contracts combine to indi-
cate that individuals' well-being depends on an array of rights meant to 
reinforce activities of exchange and private consumption. In a classical 
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economy, questions of distributive justice arise, where the fairness of dif-
ferent possible uses of an economy's surplus become central. Here 
different standards for just distribution of goods compete, reflecting dif-
ferent expectations about the reproduction of types of roles available to 
individuals in economic growth. Nonetheless, that distributional justice 
judgments exist at all demonstrates that individual capacities and well-
being are generally understood in a developmental sense. That is, debate 
over fair use of an economy's surplus presupposes that individuals are 
transformable beings whose natures are not tied to inherited property 
accumulations. Thus, compared to the neoclassical system, the classical 
world retains an important element of open-ended ness in its social con-
ception of the nature of the individual. 
It remains to comment briefly on the relative merits of the two views 
of individualism advanced here. Recall that neoclassism depends on a 
double claim that it is successful in its chosen domain of explanation, and 
that this is the sole domain where systematic analysis is possible. That the 
latter claim fails, it was suggested above, raises questions regarding neo-
classicism's success in its chosen domain. What, then, does the classical 
understanding of individualism imply on this score? The classical view of 
the individual relies on a variety of social criteria that establish the pre-
rogatives and rights of individuals. In effect, sociology, jurisprudence, 
theology, ethics and so on combine to determine the limits and bound-
aries on individuality. On the neoclassical view, however, individuals' 
distinctiveness is rather a matter of their unique and separate psycholo-
gies. Specifically, since individuals' desires are private in nature, 
individuals are distinguished from one another by having their own 
respective sets of desires, or by having preferences over goods that are 
uniquely their own. 
But note that there is a problem in this characterization of individual-
ity. To be able to speak of distinct individuals we must be able to say what 
it is that distinguishes anyone individual from other individuals. But it 
begs the question to say that an individual's own preferences distinguish 
that individual from other individuals, since reference to an individual's 
own preferences presupposes the very individual whom those preferences 
are meant to distinguish. Individuals having uniquely their own prefer-
ences, therefore, is insufficient for establishing the boundaries on 
individuality, and rather signals that those boundaries need to be estab-
lished on some other basis. Neoclassicism, however, has no other basis for 
establishing these boundaries, because it operates with a conception of 
the individual as an entirely subjective being. It thus lacks a coherent con-
cept of the individual, and must accordingly rely on postulating that 
individual action can be explained on the basis of private psychologies. 
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Indeed , methodological individualism has generally been defended in a 
priori terms or as a tautology about utility maximization. 
Classical economics, then, appears to explain better the nature of indi-
viduality in seeing individuals against a backdrop of social relations 
which may be investigated from many different points of view. Individual 
action and the causal effectiveness of individual behaviour then depend 
upon the context in which individuals operate, and the classical analysis 
of value, distribution and growth incorporate this insight. In addition, 
the broader social conception of individuals in classical thought permits 
an arguably richer normative discourse regarding economic and social 
policy. Though these latter themes were given initial development by the 
early classical economists, it is worth noting that they have received 
greater attention in post-Kaleckian, post-Sraffian debates over command 
of an economy's surplus. 
JOHN B. DAVIS 
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Innovation 
There are few topics in economics which combine such a high degree of 
importance with such a great difficulty with respect to analytical treatment. 
No one doubts that the economic development of capitalism has been 
bound inseparably with the creation and application of new final goods, 
new methods of production and the exploitation of previously undiscov-
ered or unexploitable natural resources. The capitalist dynamic and 
qualitative change in these senses are synonymous. Smith, Ricardo and 
Marx were well aware of the magnitude of the innovation-led transforma-
tions that they saw at work (Rosenberg, 1976). The economic historian 
recognizes this dualism when explaining the growth in per capita incomes 
in the industrialized world by linking it with the various phenomena associ-
ated with structural change: new activities replace existing activities and 
give rise to the changing relative importance of firms, sectors, regions and 
countries within the capitalist system. Whether Schum peter was right to 
apply the label 'creative destruction' is debatable, but he was certainly correct 
